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With its universal claim, the neopatrimonialism concept principally permits comparative analysis -also across different regions -and might, in turn, contribute to comparative area studies (Basedau/Köllner 2007) . Unfortunately, scholars have hardly used the concept for systematic cross-regional analysis. Attempting to narrow this gap, we endeavour to let the concept "travel" from sub-Saharan Africa to Southeast Asia and Latin America. This shall serve to link region-specific bodies of research and to test the concept's universal value.
Empirically, this article compares neopatrimonial politics and their effects on the tax administration in Argentina, Venezuela, Indonesia, the Philippines, Kenya and Zambia. It is common to utilise taxation for assessing state-society relations (Lieberman 2003; Cheibub 1998) . Institutions responsible for generating state income often serve as focal points of political "interference" (Rose-Ackerman 2004: 28; Anderson et al. 2003: 10) . Accordingly, it can be assumed that neopatrimonial dynamics can be found at tax administrations in particular, with the main hypothesis being that a high degree of neopatrimonialism limits both the capability to raise revenue and the prospects for administrative reform. 2 This paper endeavours to contribute to the literature on neopatrimonialism and tax collection as a core state function by means of a small-N research design, comparing six countries from a total of three world regions: Argentina and Venezuela, Indonesia and the Philippines, and Kenya and Zambia. 3 As colonialism with its "imported" statehood (Badie 2000 (Badie [1992 ) is the central factor explaining the initial fusion of different logics of rule, all cases analysed are former colonies. Within each region, the two cases have similar GDP per capita and inequality levels. However, our approach does not qualify as a "most different systems" design with the experimental rigour envisaged by Przeworski and Teune (1970: 31-46 ).
Cross-regional differences are substantial. Therefore, the explanatory power and the general applicability of the results are restricted. Yet, as the case studies follow the same analytical grid, they allow for comparison, which in turn should stimulate further research.
Our analysis presents two main findings: (1) Despite substantive limitations, neopatrimonialism can enrich cross-regional analysis of state politics. In order to be fruitful for comparative analysis, systematic operationalisation is necessary. (2) The effects of neopatrimonialism on tax administration are highly contingent. Even in those country cases that have experienced a rise in neopatrimonial politics, tax administration has been effectively executed, whereas in others tax administration has remained comparatively ineffective.
The article starts by presenting current research using the concept of neopatrimonialism.
It then introduces indicators to comparatively analyse neopatrimonialism and the capability 6 Christian von Soest, Karsten Bechle and Nina Korte: How Neopatrimonialism Affects Tax Administration of the tax administration. The paper assesses the effects of neopatrimonialism on the collection of revenue in the six case studies. On the basis of the analysis, the concluding section assesses neopatrimonialism's empirical value, presents comparative results on letting this concept "travel" to different world regions and reflects on the empirical results. Zolberg (1969) and Eisenstadt (1973) were the first to apply the concept of patrimonialism to contemporary societies, further specifying it with the prefix "modern" or "neo". While Latin America specialists have largely ignored neopatrimonialism (Bechle 2010) , scholars working on different regions such as Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East and Eastern Europe have put the concept to use. In particular, the neopatrimonialism concept has served to frame the crisis of "the African postcolonial state's administrative and bureaucratic capacities" (Bach 2011: 280-281) .
The Current Use of Neopatrimonialism

Basic Conceptual Issues
The term denotes the simultaneous operation of two Weberian ideal types of domination:
patrimonial rule (a subtype of traditional rule) and rational-legal rule (Weber 1980 (Weber [1922 : [133] [134] 136) . The "neo" in neopatrimonialism stands for the formal institutions and rationallegal rule of the state, which coexist with patrimonial relations. Patrimonialism connotes that a patron bestows gifts from public and private resources on followers to secure their loyalty.
Clients, in turn, obtain material benefits and protection. 4 Patrons are typically office-holders who use public funds or their power to build a personal following. Social practice as a result is fundamentally different compared to the impersonal formal rules which are supposed to guide official action.
Taking into account the existence of laid-down rules and administrative procedures, it is inappropriate to downplay the rational-legal aspect of neopatrimonial rule as Chabal and Daloz (1999: 17) do when they maintain that "in most African countries, the state is no more than a decor, a pseudo-Western facade masking the realities of deeply personalized relations". Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that every polity exhibits patrimonial features. The systemic character of neopatrimonialism is a matter of degree and not of principle.
This paper endeavours to use neopatrimonialism as an analytical framework and not, as is commonly the case in research on Africa, to normatively equate it with "predatory and antidevelopmental forms of power" (Bach 2011: 282) .
Numerous recent publications have criticised the loose application of the concept (e.g. Therkildsen 2005; de Grassi 2008; Pitcher et al. 2009 ). Denunciations of the "catch-all" or deus 7 ex machina use of the concept are common (Theobald 1982 on patrimonialism; Erdmann/ Engel 2007) . Critics claim that scholars invoke the concept to describe contrasting phenomena while glossing over substantial differences.
Only some works use neopatrimonialism as an analytical concept for systematic comparison (Budd 2004; Hensell 2009 ). It is exactly this empirical application that could provide new insights into the way authority is exercised in different polities, also across different regions.
In response, this article seeks to apply indicators which permit cross-country, cross-regional and inter-temporal comparisons of neopatrimonial rule.
Neopatrimonialism and Public Administration
It is useful to distinguish analytically between the political and the administrative arena of governance, taking into account the two spheres' different rationalities. To a large degree, politics in a state is routinised through its administrative staff. That is to say, authority predominantly is bureaucracy. Neopatrimonialism on the administrative level can principally be analysed as deviations from Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy. 5 His conceptualisation involves a clear separation between the private and the public sphere and focuses on the expertise of the civil servants (Weber 1980 (Weber [1922 . This ideal type also holds valid for the tax administration.
It can be hypothesised that neopatrimonialism leads to political interference in tax administration, which in conjunction with other factors reduces state revenue. Two prime forms of undue influence from the political sphere are possible: first, the placement of unqualified tax officers, who fill patronage positions; second, neopatrimonial interference with the tax administration's day-to-day business -for instance in order to prevent audits at businesses that enjoy political protection or to harass opponents of the dominating political elite.
Neopatrimonialism: The Comparative Picture
Using neopatrimonialism as a concept for systematic comparison of different countries and regions requires precise conceptualisation and operationalisation. We use a variation of Bratton and van de Walle's conception (1997: 63-68) , which focuses on the three dimensions:
systematic clientelism and (3) corruption.
We argue that an analysis of these dimensions allows us to estimate the degree of neopatrimonialism in a state and its development over time. The operationalisation of the three di- Soest (2009: 56-58) . "Concentration of power" analyses the extent to which the president dominates the political setting. To assess the degree of domination, we calculate a power concentration index (PCI) by assessing the average tenure of the president in relation to that of key ministers, for two periods in each country case.
Apart from Venezuela, the first period under review presents an authoritarian regime type, while the second period presents a democratic or hybrid regime type following a transition. We assume that a significantly longer tenure of the president in relation to the ministers correlates with a high informal concentration of power in the president. Researchers use the concept of "systematic clientelism" to analyse the distribution of government positions in exchange for personal loyalty and support. Here, we examine the development of cabinet size and -briefly -public administration growth. Our assumption is that an unwarranted enlargement of the cabinet and/or of the public administration correlates with a high degree of clientelism. "Corruption" is the use of public office for private gain. We use the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Index (WGI) indicator "control of corruption" (Kaufmann et al. 2009 ). Table 1 demonstrates that the informal concentration of power in the president markedly differs between the cases analysed. Period 1 constitutes the period with the most pronounced differences in the PCI, with Argentina displaying a particularly low PCI value and Zambia a particularly high one. Following transition, informal power concentration declined significantly in Indonesia and Zambia. In the other cases, we observe some increase. Here, Venezuela is the most prominent case, displaying a major rise in power concentration from period one to two. 
Concentration of Power
Systematic Clientelism
Cabinets on average comprise between 15 and 25 cabinet ministers. Here, the outlier cases are Indonesia, above average since the last decade of the authoritarian regime, and Argentina, below average for the entire period under observation. In the last few years, the cases of Kenya and Venezuela are particularly interesting, as they experienced a very pronounced enlargement in cabinet size (see Figure 1 ). With regard to the provision of personal favours, in some cases growth of public administration can be a more meaningful indicator and hence should be included in the analysis. Particularly remarkable is the high and increasing share of public officials in Venezuela, which today account for more than eight per cent of the population. In the other country cases, public employment is below three per cent of the population. Out of all the countries, Argentina's government has most strongly reduced the size of public administration (1.5 per cent), though since the 2000s it has been on a slight rise again. 6
Corruption
All six cases display a low control of corruption, with scores on the WGI indicator "control of corruption" being negative (see Figure 2 ). Nevertheless, differences are observable. While at Taking all indicators together, Argentina displays the lowest level of neopatrimonialism over the entire period of observation. Indonesia and Zambia show the most significant reduction of neopatrimonial tendencies. Kenya and the Philippines appear slightly more neopatrimonial at present, while Venezuela shows a marked increase.
Assessing the Capability to Raise Revenue
It is useful to analytically differentiate between process and output as two interrelated elements of tax administration's capability. The process deals with "how" taxes are being collected. The output refers to the extent the tax administration is able to fulfil its core task, the collection of revenue ("how much") (von Soest 2007) . Two process dimensions are of particular interest from a neopatrimonial point of view: a) human resource management and b) the day-to-day operations of the tax administration. It can be expected that in neopatrimonial systems both dimensions are highly influenced by political interests, which in turn reduces output. Both dimensions will be dealt with in the six country case studies below. The following section analyses the revenue performance of the six tax administrations.
In accordance with other researchers, tax administrators and donor agencies, we assess the total taxes collected in relation to a country's GDP: the tax-to-GDP ratio. Direct taxes are administratively and politically "difficult" to collect because they are visible and "felt" by a majority of the population (Burgess/Stern 1993: 818) . Therefore, the amount of direct (income) taxes and indirect taxes -that is, value-added tax (VAT) and international tradeserve as additional indicators for this study.
As Figure 3 shows, the tax-to-GDP ratios of the six case studies currently stand between 11.1 and 20.2 per cent, significantly below the OECD average of 33.7 per cent (OECD 2010). balanced. In all cases aside from the Philippines, the percentage of income taxes collected today is higher than in 1995. Table 2 below presents the detailed break-down since 1995. Day-to-day operations. Up until the 1990s, experts and the general public rated Argentina's tax administration a corrupt, highly inefficient and oversized organisation. Citizens lacked incentives to pay taxes because the probability that tax evasion would be detected and punished was very low (Bergman 2003: 602) . As shown above, the tax-to-GDP ratio has more than doubled since the early 1990s, partly as a result of an increasing professionalism among tax administrators. Standard operating procedures were established and are followed. Tax administrators interviewed did not report any interference from superiors or politicians.
Nevertheless, media reports suggest that the tax administration has sometimes been used for political means. These findings are consistent with the assumption that neopatrimonialism exerts some influence on the tax administration, although on a minor scale, but they cannot explain the significantly improved output of the AFIP in recent years.
Venezuela
Democracy in Venezuela was established as early as 1958. For several decades, the country stood out for its stability, unique in Latin America. The consensual political system was greased by high oil revenues. However, oil wealth also increased inefficiency and corruption. Thus, entrance exams are averted and political control over tax administrators is enhanced.
Since 2000, the president, no longer the minister of finance, has been given the power to appoint and dismiss the superintendent.
Day-to-day operations.
Despite increasing politicisation, the SENIAT remains one of Venezuela's most professional bodies. Even most interviewed critics of the current government emphasised the orderly procedures within tax administration. The SENIAT is widely regarded as an island of competence within Venezuela's public administration. Respondents from within the tax administration generally ruled out political interventions or interventions by superiors in the day-to-day work of tax administrators. Increasingly good performance is mirrored in the rising amount of taxes collected. Contrary to our expectation, a marked increase in neopatrimonialism has not led to a deterioration of the tax administration.
Indonesia
Contemporary Indonesia can be distinguished into two distinct periods: the authoritarian New Order regime under President Soeharto and the democratic Reformasi era since 1998. As shown in the comparative analysis above, neopatrimonialism was very prevalent during the New Order regime. Following democratisation, neopatrimonialism persists, yet seems to have experienced a slight decline overall.
Neopatrimonial profile. The PCI demonstrates that the highly concentrated power in the hands of the president subsided following democratisation. Constitutional amendments paved the way for substantial political fragmentation and strengthened legislatures. The dis-tribution of personal favours in exchange for personal loyalty constituted a central strategy during the New Order (Crouch 1979) . Among other effects, this caused ministerial cabinets to become bloated, and public service oversized and ill-equipped. The Reformasi era has not rid itself of clientelism, yet on a national level, competence and merit are gaining importance for appointments and promotions. Corruption is deeply embedded in Indonesia's political, economic and administrative structures, affecting all levels of society.
While the pattern of corruption during Soeharto's reign was largely centralised (he, himself, being the principal patron), within the last decade, partly as a result of the executive's strong anti-corruption stance and partly as a result of decentralisation, corruption has been shifting from the national to the local level. Patrons have proliferated and the absolute amount of corruption remains high. On the basis of Indonesia's neopatrimonial development, we assume that the tax administration was impeded by neopatrimonialism during the New Order regime and has been able to improve its performance thereafter.
Politics and tax administration. Indonesia's primary revenue-raising agency is the Directorate General of Taxes (DGT), under the jurisdiction of the Department of Finance. As described in section 4, the DGT's tax performance has been deficient. Recently, the significant decline of oil reserves raised the importance of domestic revenues for achieving fiscal consolidation 
The Philippines
The contemporary Philippines can be distinguished into the authoritarian period under President Marcos (1965 Marcos ( -1986 ) and the democratic period since 1986. Neopatrimonial rule has featured during both periods, yet the degree of neopatrimonialism tends to depend more on individual presidents' governing styles than on regime type.
Neopatrimonial profile. Power concentration in the Philippines can be divided into three different (but closely interrelated) strands: the absolute concentration of power in the hands of a small, powerful oligarchic elite; an already extensive formal concentration of power in the president; and the degree to which different presidents were able to push these bounda- The more Arroyo's legitimacy was challenged, the more she resorted to obtaining people's loyalty by providing favours.
Current President Aquino has pledged to restore the damage done by his predecessor. As established by the interviews conducted and the WGI indicator presented above, corruptiona widely regarded standard operating procedure -has increased in recent years. On the basis of the Philippines' neopatrimonial profile, we expect that the tax administration has been a focal point of political influence and riddled by administrative problems impeding its performance.
Politics and tax administration. Subordinate to the Department of Finance, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) is the Philippines' primary revenue-raising agency. The BIR's performance and reputation have fluctuated over time; however, both have been rather unfavourable overall (cf. Table 2 ). Tax administration reforms have been half-heartedly introduced over the last decade, and they are widely perceived to not have taken root yet. As a fiscal crisis is 
Day-to-day operations.
The BIR is perceived as one of the Philippines' most corrupt agencies. Complex and conflicting tax legislation, low pay and inadequate penalties allow corruption to prosper. Citizens refuse to pay taxes as they do not see that their payments are used for good purposes. Overall taxes payable are often a matter of negotiation, the process and amounts due are unpredictable. There is no agreement on whether the main problem lies with tax administrators at the management level or with tax administrators at the lower and middle levels, nor is there agreement on whether the system is pyramidal or dispersed. The degree of political interference on the operational level is unknown, yet there have been reports that, while not interfering for their own purposes, politicians have done so on behalf of their friends and relatives. There have also been claims that politicians have tried to use the tax administration as a tool for political prosecution. For the case of the Philippines, we can conclude that neopatrimonialism indeed has impeded the operations of the tax administration.
Kenya
In 1969 was accompanied by widespread expectations that his government would bring fundamental changes in governance, including a "zero tolerance" policy on corruption (Steeves 2006 ).
However, Kenya still features among the most corrupt countries in the world and is also near the bottom of this sample, performing better than only Venezuela. Despite successive initiatives, there is still clear evidence of systematic misuse of public resources (Wrong 2009; Githongo 2008) . Cabinet ministers are changed on a regular basis -even more frequently than under autocratic rule.
The ministerial cabinet has always been a major means for providing personal favours.
Since Day-to-day operations. Principally, the KRA is given legal protection from political interference to carry out its routine functions. Its day-to-day operations are guided by an independent board of directors which also comprises representatives from the private sector.
Field research showed that taxpayers overall are treated equally. Yet, respondents indicated that some powerful politicians and their businesses are not audited to the same degree as other citizens and companies. However, evidence is inconclusive.
Corruption in the tax administration has been reduced but has not vanished. Those offices which are not yet computerised and which have direct interaction with taxpayers remain plagued by high corruption levels. The audit section has also recurrently experienced corruption cases; one officer said that they "are sitting on a gold mine". Nevertheless, corruption is not institutionalised, and the KRA is seen as one of the most professional agencies in the country. Overall, the KRA operates quite effectively despite being situated in a neopatrimonial environment. The Kenyan case therefore does not confirm initial expectations.
Zambia
Zambia's first President Kaunda served for 27 years. In 1991, opposition candidate Frederick Chiluba ousted Kaunda in reintroduced multiparty elections. The elections put a formal end to the one-party state, which the Kaunda government had promulgated in December 1972.
Overall, neopatrimonial practices seem to have receded since the transition in 1991.
Neopatrimonial profile. The informal concentration of power endured during Zambia's Second Republic (1972 Republic ( -1991 and the subsequent, multiparty Third Republic. As indicated by Table 1 , ministers are still being changed every two and a half years on average. However, the average presidential tenure has reduced significantly. The current constitution bars people from serving more than two terms as president. An attempt to remove this provision to allow President Chiluba to run for a third term was unsuccessful. As in other African countries, the expansion of the ministerial cabinet has served as the prime means for providing clientelist favours by the president. Yet, the size of cabinet has generally remained constant in recent years and is smaller than it was under President Chiluba. Zambia's "control of corruption" scores in the WGI have been low but have improved in recent years, in particular due to President Mwanawasa's high-profile anti-corruption drive. This implies that Zambia's tax administration is likely to have also improved in performance over the years.
Politics and tax administration. A prominent part of the reform package was the strengthening of the tax administration. In April 1994, the government outsourced the collection of revenue from the ministry of finance and launched the Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA).
The IMF had made the strengthening of revenue collection a precondition for the provision of new loans (Hill 2004: 141) . The ZRA acted as a forceful symbol of the government's commitment to improve Zambia's highly deficient public administration. By and large, the government has supported the ZRA's autonomous status, particularly since President Chiluba ended his second term in 2001.
Human resource management. The ZRA pursues its own recruitment policy. Recruits for the well-paid positions at the authority are hired on the basis of interviews and aptitude tests. 7 In addition, a minimum qualification requirement was introduced to avert attempts to fill positions through patronage. has been mirrored in the autonomy of the ZRA. However, despite improvements in the taxto-GDP ratio, Zambia's tax gap -the difference between tax potential and taxes actually collected -remains large.
Conclusion
The empirical analysis has demonstrated that neopatrimonialism's prospects for cross-regional comparison are limited and promising at the same time. To start with, neopatrimonialism encompasses many empirical manifestations, constraining the concept's explanatory power. The specific expression might vary from country to country (inter-country difference), between state organisations in one country (intra-country difference) and between several points in time (inter-temporal difference).
Despite these significant challenges, it is possible to operationalise the concept by rendering its basic premise into specific indicators. In this way, it facilitates cross-regional analysis of political dynamics in different states, often characterised by floating boundaries between the public and the private realm. However, several indicators are more valid for some world regions than for others. The size of the ministerial cabinet is arguably a good approximation for clientelism in sub-Saharan Africa, whereas in Latin America the cabinet has not functioned as a major means for the president to provide favours. Also, it remains questionable whether corruption perception indices such as the WGI "control of corruption" used in this article allow us to precisely establish whether there is actually "more" corruption in Venezuela than in Kenya or the Philippines. this might occur as a result of the country's new constitution, which will limit presidential powers, and in the Philippines, new President Aquino's introduction of measures to reverse neopatrimonial strategies employed by his predecessor might help reduce these structures.
There is no systematic relationship between the development of neopatrimonialism and the capability to raise revenue. The examples of the SENIAT, the KRA and the ZRA confirm that merit-based and comparatively autonomous public agencies can operate even in neopatrimonial systems. It is striking that in all six countries, tax administration has grown in importance. This also includes those countries with significant natural resource incomes: Venezuela, Indonesia and Zambia. Decreasing incomes from oil in Indonesia and highly volatile copper revenues in Zambia have stimulated a stronger focus on the taxation of citizens and companies. Declining oil rents initially also motivated Venezuela to improve taxation. But even when soaring oil prices brought new windfall profits at the beginning of the twentyfirst century, the Chávez administration -for which our indicators show a strong recurrence to neopatrimonial strategies of rule -has kept the tax administration effective.
The case studies point generally to the extraordinary relevance of actor variables in shaping neopatrimonial strategies and more specifically to the relationship of political actors to the tax administration. Presidents Chávez and Chiluba, for example, have reverted to neopatrimonial strategies, but have treated tax administration differently: Chávez and Chiluba seem to have supported, respectively, the SENIAT's and the ZRA's autonomy overall, albeit with notable exceptions. This result strongly supports the emerging consensus in most recent literature that neopatrimonialism "does not predetermine outcomes" (Bach 2011: 290) . The importance of actor variables in influencing the development of neopatrimonialism and its effects warrants further detailed analysis.
